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Abstract
The literature on policy convergence has identified numerous aspects and possible causal
drivers of convergence. We classify and condense these into a comprehensive framework,
which is operationalized for support policies for renewable energy sources in the EU. Our
analysis advances the conceptual discussion in two ways. First, we demonstrate that
conceptual specifications of convergence (e.g., whether to focus on policy targets, instrument
design or policy outcomes) rely on normative assumptions. Second, we argue that theories of
economic and political convergence processes complement each other: studies of economic
convergence are apolitical as they do not aim to explain why states choose or should choose
the same policies to solve a given problem. At the same time, economic convergence yields a
necessary condition for successful policy convergence. The empirical evidence, in turn,
suggests conditional convergence of support policies and renewables shares in the EU, but
does not hint at absolute convergence.
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1. Introduction
“[A]dvanced industrial states are facing similar problems and are tending to solve them in
similar ways” (Bennet 1991: 218). This, in a nutshell, is policy convergence. Alas, we need
not go far to see this simple rationale shattered – to some, for instance, the EU appears as a 
system of differentiated integration (cf. Leruth and Lord 2015); others ask, more sharply,
“how much distrustful divergence the European Union can contain without degenerating into
ineffectiveness and fragmentation” (Hayward and Wurzel 2012: 1). Against this backdrop, we
analyse how the concept of convergence, understood as the increase of policy similarity over
time (cf. Kerr 1983, Drezner 2001, Holzinger et al. 2008b), can be framed and productively
employed within a contested empirical context: support policies for electricity from renewable
energy sources (RES)1 in the EU.  
Energy policy in the EU has been scolded as too fragmented and in need of “Europeanization”
(e.g., Tagliapietra 2014). In particular, national (i.e., unilateral) policy approaches towards
RES are criticized and advocated to be replaced by more coordinated RES support on EU­
level (e.g., Hübner et al. 2012, Teyssen 2013, Unteutsch and Lindenberger 2014). At the same
time, the actual status of EU energy policy cooperation is evolving rather slowly. On the one
hand, the EU Commission launches proposal after proposal in the hope of bolstering Member
States’ cooperation. For instance, following increased tensions between the EU and Russia,
the Commission published “a framework strategy for a resilient Energy Union with a forward­
looking climate change policy” (EU Commission 2015) that puts an emphasis on the 
coordination of RES policies. On the other hand, Member States have repeatedly displayed
their willingness to retain their sovereignty over energy and climate policy (Callies and Hey
2013), and have largely abstained from exploiting the opportunities provided by the RES
cooperation mechanisms (e.g., joint projects, joint support schemes or statistical transfers, see
Klinge Jacobsen et al. 2014).2 
The main economic arguments for more coordination of RES policies concern economies of
scale and spill-over effects: existing RES targets could be met more cost-effectively if
administered on an EU-wide scale because of a more efficient geographical allocation of RES
installations (Böckers et al. 2013). Furthermore, the impact of intermittent RES such as wind 
and solar PV on security of supply is not limited to national borders. For example,
1 Throughout the paper „RES“ stands for electricity from renewable energy sources.
2 Moreover, Member States sometimes employ separate policy instruments in addition to what has been agreed
on the EU level, as, for instance, the UK’s carbon floor price as add-on to the EU emissions trading scheme
demonstrates.
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intermittent RES generation in Germany may impair grid stability in neighboring countries.
At the same time, an EU-wide coordination of security of energy supply policies could help to
smooth regional and national imbalances, and might render purely national capacity
mechanisms unnecessary (cf. Meyer and Gore 2015). This also points to economies of scope
from organizing energy policy in a larger area with common rules. The extent to which a 
homogenized approach would be preferable, however, is unclear. National RES policies may
be better suited to reflect the potential heterogeneity of preferences among EU Member States
as well as local externalities from energy generation (Gawel et al. 2014; Strunz et al. 2014). 
So while there may be a need for more energy policy coordination across the EU, complete 
homogeneity might not be desirable either (Tews 2015).  
Furthermore, it is unclear at which political level – EU or Member States – energy policy
convergence can actually be promoted effectively. In the long-run, significant “practical”
reasons may render bottom-up processes a more likely pathway towards EU integration than
coercive top-down harmonization: Legal constraints and politico-economic incentives make 
Member States’ politicians averse to sovereignty transfer (Strunz et al. 2015). For instance,
RES are often nationally promoted as a vehicle for regional development and job creation
and/or as a way to reduce regional environmental impacts, which could not be guaranteed in
case of an EU-approach. Thus, bottom-up processes may be the most feasible coordination 
pathway. Also, from a normative point of view, the “laboratory federalism” argument (Oates
1972, 1999) points to the advantages of experimental learning arising from decentralized
search for solutions as compared to centralized problem-solving. In practice, a smaller group
of countries may take the lead and a more harmonized approach could then evolve as the core
group expands. Obviously, bottom-up processes may also result in policy divergence – and 
the emerging heterogeneity may yield political tensions as well as economic efficiency losses,
so there is no a priori reason to assume that bottom-up processes promote policy coordination. 
In addition, convergence is not necessarily “good” in the sense of diffusing the optimal
policies. Alignment processes may also entail the widespread adaption of suboptimal policies.
Thus, numerous theoretical and empirical ambiguities abide. Astonishingly, the relevant
literature is rather dispersed: there is a long trail of political science literature, including
empirical studies on convergence of environmental policies (e.g., Holzinger et al. 2008a) as
well as specific case studies on RES policy convergence (e.g., Jacobs 2012, Kitzing et al.
2012). Rather independently, economists have thoroughly investigated (both theoretically and 
empirically) the general mechanisms of economic (growth) convergence (for overviews see 
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Rodriguez and Rodrik 2001, Islam 2003), and its relationship with environmental pollution
convergence (e.g., Brock and Taylor 2010). Moreover, econometric studies assess
international convergence along various environmental indicators (e.g., Camarero et al. 2013,
Pettersson et al. 2014). But as Plümper and Schneider (2009) observe, there exists a gap
between theoretical and empirical work on convergence because compared to the many
theoretically proposed drivers of convergence, the empirical evidence is rather weak. We 
point to one hitherto neglected possible reason for this gap: the complementarity of economic
and political processes of convergence. Often, economic convergence forms a necessary
condition for successful policy convergence. For instance, the troubles with Europe’s
monetary union probably result from insufficient economic convergence yet fully harmonized
monetary policies (see early warnings from e.g., Björksten and Syrjänen 2000, Eichengreen
1998 and the recent analysis of Streeck and Elsässer 2015). Then again, theories of economic
convergence may in part be apolitical: they may explain why states are facing the same 
problems but they cannot account for why states should employ the same solutions to address
these problems. What seems to be lacking, therefore, is a systematic combination of theories
of both economic and political convergence.
Against this background, the paper’s first objective is to disentangle and systemize the
different conceptual strands of convergence. Applied to the example of RES policies in the
EU, this means a number of conceptual specifications, starting with the basic definition of
policy convergence. For instance, while a narrow definition refers to bottom-up processes
only, a broader definition includes top-down processes as well. Thus, we show how the
contested status of RES policies in the EU is mirrored by conceptual complexity: in 
particular, different normative views on RES support (and RES market integration) translate
into different conceptual framings. Once these conceptual specifications are made, the paper’s
second objective concerns the integration of separate theoretical approaches. We argue that
theories of economic and political convergence processes complement each other in 
explaining successful policy convergence.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we explicate specific aspects of
policy convergence so as to match the concept with a given empirical context. Subsequently,
we explore in Section 3 under what conditions and for what reasons convergence may occur,
combining conceptual literature from both economics and political science. We then review
the empirical evidence for economic convergence in general and RES policy convergence in
the EU more specifically. Finally, our findings are summarized and discussed in Section 4. 
4
 
 
  
     
   
   
  
  
    
 
  
  
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
    
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. What is policy convergence?
Most commonly, policy convergence is understood as the “increase of policy similarity over
time” (Holzinger et al. 2008b: 24). However, the notion of policy convergence has left a
considerable trail in the literature and a variety of definitions could be brought forward. In the
following, we, therefore, review and systemize the different conceptual choices that need be
made so as to arrive at a precise concept of policy convergence. Again, in order to 
contextualize an otherwise abstract discussion, we use the case of RES policies as an
example. 
2.1. The object of policy convergence
Figure 1 provides a stylized overview on the development and implementation of public
policies. Needless to say, it is not meant to be a comprehensive and an entirely realistic
representation of politics.3 Rather, the scheme will be helpful for relating different concepts of
convergence to specific stages of the policy process.
Objectives
Targets
Instruments
Implementation
Outcome
Evaluation / feedback 
Figure 1: Stylized overview of the different stages of the policy process
3 For instance, Figure 1 does not elaborate on the role of stakeholder involvement in policy formulation.
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Compared to rather general notions of convergence such as “the tendency of policies to grow
more alike, in the form of increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances”
(Kerr 1983: 3, cited in Drezner 2001: 53), we obtain more specific concepts of convergence
when focusing on particular stages of the above scheme. Similarly, Bennet (1991) argues that
policy convergence may relate to the aspects of objectives, content, instruments, outcomes and 
style of policies. The following discussion demonstrates that the question on which policy
aspect/stage to focus on is closely related to normative questions on why convergence might
be desirable.
First, objectives are of interest in the context of policy convergence only insofar as the long­
term trajectory of policies is concerned. For instance, one might explore whether all EU
Member States conform to the main objective of the EU Roadmap 2050 towards a 
decarbonization of European energy provision or whether some Member States aim at
maintaining a relatively high fossil-fuel share also in the long run. Policy targets, which
typically represent quantified values that shall be attained in a certain period of time, may be
analyzed to acknowledge distributional aspects: next to economic reasons (see below), “fair
burden sharing” may be seen as a cornerstone of an EU-wide energy transition. For instance,
consider a hypothetical scenario where RES targets are diverging: if the level of ambition
with respect to RES deployment generally seems to increase in heterogeneity, this may
hamper overall progress in that relatively more ambitious Member States may come under
internal pressure to slow down RES deployment (“why should we push forward if other
Member States do not follow and do their bit?”).
Second, convergence of policy instruments is of particular interest from the normative
perspective of (narrow) economic efficiency. Subsidizing RES deployment in the EU will be
least costly – in terms of minimizing RES generation costs only – if the geographical
allocation of RES facilities closely follows natural conditions. Such a deployment pattern, in
turn, could be achieved via a harmonized scheme of RES support instruments in the EU
(Unteutsch and Lindenberger 2014). Thus, a range of benefits, including economies of scale
in RES production, might be realized. Yet this line of argument implicitly assumes that 
convergence of RES instruments also brings along convergence of support levels. If, in
contrast, there is convergence of support instruments along with sustained diversity of support
levels, the cost-savings vanish. In other words, instrument alignment per se is not sufficient
for cost-effectiveness (in terms of overall generation costs). Accounting for country-specific
6
 
 
  
 
   
   
  
       
   
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
    
    
    
   
 
   
     
 
  
  
    
 
    
 
benefits of RES, in turn, questions the economic desirability of converging 
instruments/support levels in the first place (cf. Söderholm 2008a). 
Third, convergence may refer to outcomes. Yet, the policy outcomes may be more due to 
other factors rather than being intended policy effects. For instance, RES shares are
importantly affected by the cost of these technologies relative to the price of conventional
energy sources. The latter, in turn, is influenced by a number of exogenous variables, such as
the world market prices for coal and natural gas. Thus, outcome convergence appears as a
weak proxy for policy convergence, as it may be primarily driven by strong global factors.
Then again, one interesting question is whether policy manages to “even out” differences in
natural conditions so that convergence in observed outcomes obtains despite structural
differences. In the context of climate policy, however, empirical analyses have found that per
capita carbon dioxide emissions firmly depend on country-specific characteristics such as
climate and resource endowments (Pettersson et al. 2014), and at the global level there is little
evidence of carbon convergence. A major rationale to look at outcome convergence may be
distributional aspects. The reasoning here is exactly the same as in the case of policy targets
(fair burden sharing).
In conclusion, it is important to acknowledge that policy convergence of a particular aspect
(cf. Figure 1: objectives-targets-instruments-outcomes) may not align with convergence in 
terms of another aspect – in fact, convergence of policy instruments may actually be directly
responsible for diverging outcomes. To see this, consider the case of Sweden and Norway
who merged their quota schemes by establishing a common market for RES certificates in
2012. The aim of such a common market is not to achieve identical RES shares. In fact, the
scheme can be “expected to promote increased wind power in Norway rather than Sweden”
due to Norwegian comparative advantages (Söderholm 2008b: 2061). In the same vein, the
calls for a uniform quota scheme in the EU (Hübner et al. 2012, Böckers et al. 2013) actually
tend to promote diverging RES shares across the EU following optimal geographical 
allocation of RES installations: wind farms along North European shores, photovoltaic energy
in Southern Europe and, conversely, less RES production in Central Europe’s centres of
population and industrial production.  
Hence, different means of measuring policy convergence are related to various normative
concepts of why convergence may be desirable: converging policy support levels may be
desirable in terms of achieving minimum generation costs of RES deployment. In this respect,
converging outcomes or targets would actually not be desirable but detrimental from a narrow
7
 
 
   
   
 
     
   
  
  
   
  
  
 
   
  
   
 
   
  
   
   
  
    
     
     
   
   
    
   
     
    
   
   
  
perspective of economic efficiency that focuses on RES generation costs only. In case a wider
economic perspective, which also addresses the benefits of a decentralized, heterogeneous
policy pattern (that is, better matching of policies and preferences, see Gawel et al. 2014,
Strunz et al. 2015), is applied, convergence of policy instruments may not be desirable.
Taking outcome convergence as a proxy for policy instrument convergence would disregard
and confuse the different normative rationales. 
In sum, the first necessary conceptual specification concerns the object of policy 
convergence (cf. Bennet 1991) and it is to be solved via clarifying the normative rationale
behind the analysis. Applied to the case of RES this means that, according to a normative
focus on either “efficiency in terms of RES generation costs” or “distributional justice”, the
analysis would choose between:
•	 policy objectives/targets (e.g., RES-objectives/targets),
•	 policy instruments (e.g., RES-policies),
•	 policy outcomes (e.g., RES-shares).
2.2. The benchmark of policy convergence
Having related outcome convergence and distributional justice, one problem becomes
obvious: differences in economic convergence should be reflected in what we regard as a just
distribution of RES shares (as a measure of some country’s ambition in deploying RES). This
directly leads us to a second conceptual specification, which concerns the benchmark of
policy convergence (cf. Baumol 1986, Holzinger et al. 2008b):
•	 absolute convergence: implicitly assumes that all countries attain the same
outcomes, e.g. in terms of the steady-state level of RES generation shares.
•	 conditional convergence: acknowledges differences among countries, for instance
regarding economic wealth and geographical potential implying that countries
may converge towards different steady-state levels.
The notion of conditional convergence may be particularly helpful to improve the concept of
outcome convergence. As noted above, a focus on pure outcomes may not relate much to
policy convergence. But correcting for Member States’ GDP could, for instance, take
exogenous economic factors sufficiently into account. Furthermore, correcting for Member
States’ RES potential would enable relating conditional outcome convergence to the
normative rationale of efficiency in terms of RES generation costs. Thus, introducing 
8
 
 
 
 
    
  
 
    
  
    
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
  
 
 
conditional convergence measures might, in principle, solve some of the problems related to 
outcome convergence. At the same time, the choice between policy instruments is a discrete
choice, which implies that instrument convergence may not be representable in terms of
absolute and conditional convergence (although it may be relevant in the case of specific
policy design issues, such as tax levels, public expenses etc.).
The crucial difference, then, lies in when we can argue to have convergence. We might say 
that conditional convergence is some weak version of policy convergence. For instance, in the
case of RES instrument convergence in terms of support levels, absolute convergence is only
achieved when support levels are equalized. In contrast, conditional convergence may 
describe a situation where countries are moving in the same direction (i.e., where not some
countries are decreasing the support while others are increasing it), and there exist systematic
and legitimate reasons for why we may never see completely equalized support levels.
Table 1 provides an overview of the conceptual specifications introduced so far.
Convergence absolute conditional
benchmark
Stage of political
process
policy targets identical RES targets identical target ratios, w.r.t.
correction factors, e.g:
- RES target/GDP/capita
- PV target/solar radiation
- Wind target/wind speed
instruments/
support level
identical instruments identical policy ratios, w.r.t.
correction factors, e.g.:
feed-in-tariff/per capita GDP
outcomes identical RES shares;
identical RES mixes;
identical deployment rates
(convergence of target
fulfillment speed)
identical RES
ratios/mixes/deployment rates, w.r.t.
correction factors, e.g:
- RES share/per capita GDP
- PV share/solar radiation
- Wind share/wind speed
Table 1: Specifying “convergence” for the case of RES policies in Europe
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2.3. The drivers of policy convergence
A third conceptual issue relates to the drivers of policy convergence: a narrow definition of
convergence may refer to bottom-up drivers only, but a wider definition would also include
top-down drivers. We will review the specific mechanisms leading to convergence in more 
detail below (see Section 3) but since the bottom-up/top-down issue is crucial for attaining a
clear concept of convergence, we need to introduce it right away. Figure 2 shows how the
general concept of convergence as “increase of policy similarity over time” may be specified
with respect to different causal mechanisms. If we focus on bottom-up processes of policy
alignment, we may further differentiate between policy diffusion (in the narrower sense4),
relying on interaction between countries, and independent policy formulation without
interaction. 
Similarity of problems
Increase of policy similarity over time
Harmonization
Policy diffusion
(emphasis on non-coercive drivers
and interdependence between
states)
Regulatory
competition
Transnational 
communication
Independent
problem-solving
Causal
Mechanism
Policy
Convergence
Top-down
process
Bottom-up processes
Figure 2: Causal mechanisms of convergence. 

Based on and adapted from Holzinger et al. (2008b: 24)
 
4 There are also wider notions of diffusion to be found in the literature that allow for top-down mechanisms, but
we focus on a narrower concept of diffusion as bottom-up process to make the matter not overly complex.
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In the case of European RES policies, bottom-up processes may be especially relevant. The
main reason here is the relative weakness of supranational EU institutions with regards to
energy policy. While the Lisbon treaty for the first time stipulates an active role for the EU in
conducting energy policy, Member States have retained their sovereignty over the general
course of their energy policies (Article 194(2) TFEU). The EU commission, on the other
hand, tries to shape Member States’ policies even if its direct regulatory power is limited. The
common EU climate and energy target architecture for 2020 and 2030 constitutes an indirect
way of top-down influence – a common framework that creates a similar problem context
(i.e., “how to increase the share of RES?”) for all Member States. Also, the Commission is
increasingly active in using the internal market directives (2003/54/EC, 2009/72/EC) to steer
Member States energy policies in the preferred direction (e.g., in the form of tender schemes
that use competitive bidding procedures to determine the level of RES support, or fixed
premium schemes that offer RES-producers a mark-up on top of the spot-market price). The
Commission’s (2014/C 200/01) “Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and 
energy 2014-2020” constitute another lever. Eventually, the “EU impact on the national
energy mix is predominantly indirect, yet powerful” (Callies and Hey 2013: 88). Furthermore,
the absence of formal coercion does not rule out other, less explicit forms of pressure. For
instance, there may be market-induced pressures that lead countries to adopt similar financial
and social policies (cf. Ther 2014). In sum, it should be noted that even if we conceptually
restrict convergence to bottom-up processes, top-down influences should not be neglected.  
2.4. The directed process of policy convergence
Finally, a fourth conceptual aspect of convergence results from its conceptual conjunction
of both process and final state. Specific definitions may accentuate these characteristics to
different degrees. Consider, for instance, the following hypothetical situation: some EU
Member States move from wide diversity towards more similarity, albeit still far from 
homogeneity. If we emphasize proximity to final states, we would rather not refer to this
situation as convergence. However, if we focus on the process of increasing similarity, we
would speak of a case of convergence – even if the process is far from finished. In a similar
vein, Plümper and Schneider (2009) distinguish between complete and incomplete
convergence.
Against this background, the process-dimension is a crucial conceptual element of
convergence, not least because it directly opens the analytical framework for investigating the
11
 
 
    
  
   
  
  
   
    
  
    
   
 
       
    
   
    
      
  
   
 
 
    
    
  
   
  
  
    
  
   
   
mechanisms that may lead to convergence (see Section 3). Furthermore, as Bennet (1991:
230) remarked: “Policy convergence should also be conceptualized in dynamic terms. The
relevant theoretical dimension is time rather than space. Otherwise the concept becomes a
synonym for similarity”. At the same time, final states are important as a benchmark against
which to measure the progress of increasing similarity. In the particular context of RES
policies, the final states are moving targets (e.g., support level or RES share/per capita GDP) 
that evolve with technological and political development: unless we refer to the EU’s long­
term aim of full decarbonisation, essentially implying 100% RES, it does not seem sensible to
consider specific support levels or RES shares as “final” in a literal way.
𝑥𝑥Formally, the process-dimension of convergence might be illustrated as follows. Given 𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 
difference between two countries A and B concerning attribute x, then the countries are
converging if
𝑥𝑥𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 < 0. 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 
This rather broad definition would have to be operationalized for given contexts, yet it is
beyond the scope of this paper to outline specific evaluation methods in detail (cf. Heichel et
al. 2005). Two issues are noteworthy, though. First, while the literature predominantly
measured the variance of a given sample, this approach is problematic (e.g., it fails to detect
conditional convergence, Plümper and Schneider 2009). Second, although the above
definition is fairly general, it does not account for the ordinal ranking of countries (e.g., do 
laggards overtake frontrunners?, cf. Heichel et al. 2005: 833ff.). 
2.5. Specifying policy convergence – Implications for the case of RES policies
In sum, the above suggests that a comprehensive analytical concept of policy convergence
relies on several specifications:
(1) Object
 convergence in terms of targets
 convergence in terms of instruments
 convergence in terms of outcomes
(2) Benchmark
 absolute convergence
 conditional convergence
12
 
 
   
 
 
  
  
     
  
 
    
     
 
   
  
     
   
        
 
   
 
 
  
   
   
  
   
  
     
 
   
 
   
 
  
(3) Drivers
 bottom-up 
 top-down 
(4) Directed process
 process – movement towards homogeneity
 final state – homogeneity
Applying this framework to the case of RES policies in the EU, the above discussion 
emphasized (1) convergence in terms of instruments, (2) conditional on economic and natural
conditions, and (3,4) unfolding via bottom-up processes. In terms of Figure 2, that would
imply a focus on the policy diffusion cluster – interdependent co-evolution of Member States’
policies within the common institutional framework of the EU. The latter may, even in
absence of explicit pressure, affect national policy making through agenda setting and other
indirect forms of influence. Moreover, be reminded that specifications (1) and (2) directly
relate to normative considerations: the more we emphasize cost-effectiveness in terms of
electricity generation costs, the more convergence would need to refer to the specific design
of RES instruments, such as support levels – in absolute terms. The broader our perspective,
so as to acknowledge heterogeneity in preferences or economic context, the more RES targets, 
outcomes and their distributions – conditional on some to-be-defined criteria – are to be
considered.
3. What drives policy convergence? Linking economic and political approaches
The introductory quote of Bennet (1991) points at an important precondition for policy
convergence – namely that states are facing similar problems. In principle, such an alignment
of issues-to-be-addressed by policy intervention can come about through different channels,
such as economic context, natural conditions, common institutional framework and
ideological background. Nevertheless, the sobering experience of Europe’s “monetary
disunion” (Streeck and Elsässer 2015) hints to a particularly strong link between economic
and policy convergence. While a common monetary policy binds the Euro group together, the
lack of i) a sufficiently homogeneous area in terms of economic fundamentals and of ii) a
fiscal stabilization mechanism have almost teared the Euro apart (thereby also supporting the
theory of optimum currency areas, see Mundell 1961, Fingleton et al. 2015). In other words,
policy harmonization without economic convergence may not be sustainable. Therefore, we
now first review the theory of and the empirical evidence for economic convergence. Yet, 
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although economic convergence may yield similarity of problems, these might be addressed
by wholly distinct policies. Hence, we subsequently review the political drivers of policy
convergence.
3.1. Economic convergence: theory and evidence
The standard model of economic growth dates back to Solow (1956). It conceptualizes growth
as extension of capital stocks (where capital includes all forms of productive assets, from
machinery to know-how). If countries exhibit similar characteristics, such as the level of
technological progress, the Solow-model predicts convergence of capital stocks (per capita)
among these countries. In case the fundamental economic characteristics differ, convergence
is not absolute but conditional, reflecting these differences. Yet, declining marginal
productivity of capital may erode differences over time: poor economies should grow faster
than rich economies because investments in the former yield higher marginal returns. 
Eventually, all countries would converge to the same steady-state level of capital (Baumol
1986). This is the so-called “catching-up” hypothesis. Within an interdepended world of trade,
economic theory traditionally sees the case for gradual convergence fostered (Ohlin 1933,
Samuelson 1948). Yet there is also a longstanding controversy over the “catching-up”
hypothesis, in particular as regards the influence of trade: for instance, it has been shown that
opening up poorer countries to trade may stop growth convergence processes and even cause 
divergence (Bajona and Kehoe 2010). 
The economic literature on growth and convergence has been connected to environmental
policies via the concept of the so-called Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC, cf. Grossmann 
and Krueger 1995). The EKC suggests an inverted-U-shape relationship between GDP and
environmental pollution: with raising wealth, pollution at first increases but then decreases.
Brock and Taylor (2010) argue that the EKC is a necessary byproduct of economic
convergence within the Solow model. Yet as to the specific mechanisms that might give rise
to such patterns, a wide range of candidates has been discussed. One prominent mechanism
relates to the increasing demand for high environmental quality with rising income levels. 
Thus, economic convergence would directly translate into convergence of demand for
generally stricter environmental policies. For instance, demand for clean energy provision
increases as poorer countries catch up; due to higher marginal productivity of capital, poorer
countries can raise their RES-shares (e.g., in terms of solar PV, wind power) faster than early
adopters, with all countries eventually converging. Conversely, without economic
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convergence, there could be little reason to expect countries to align their energy and
environmental policies and to attain similar outcomes in terms of, for instance, RES shares.
The hypothesis that in an interdependent world, characterized by trade and mobile investment
capital, economies will convergence to similar levels of wealth, however, is empirically
disputed (see Rodriguez and Rodrik 2001 as well as Islam 2003 for extensive overviews). 
And even staunch supporters of globalization concede that “catch-up will be a long, difficult
grind” (The Economist 2014). So if even mainstream economics contains doubts as to the
extent with which the theoretical mechanism of convergence-by-catching-up actually
materializes, what about the European experience?
In Europe, the post-Cold-War era revealed the strong impact of institutions, and, more
generally, of the socio-political context, on national economic trajectories. During the 1990s, 
formerly communist countries in Central Eastern and South Eastern Europe lived through
rather diverging economic developments, due to both different starting positions (e.g., in
terms of available human capital and geographical location) and different policy choices
(Ther 2014).
Within the EU, there is meagre evidence for overall economic convergence (measured in real
per capita income) but there is evidence of convergence within several subgroups – that is,
clusters of Member States growing at the same rate (Borsi and Metiu 2015). Importantly, a
clear separation between old EU-Member States and new Member States in Eastern Europe
appears: although the latter have exhibited higher growth rates, catching-up has not yet been 
sufficient in order to smooth out differences across Member States (Borsi and Metiu 2015).
This can also be seen from recent GDP per capita statistics of the EU-28: at the upper end
(omitting Luxembourg), the Netherlands stay at 31% above the EU-28 average (year 2013, 
Eurostat5). On the lower end, Bulgaria is listed with a GDP per capita of 55% below the
average. In sum, one might speak of clustered, slow and non-monotonic processes of
economic convergence in the EU.
This leads us to the apolitical character of the original Solow-model of economic growth upon
which the catching-up hypothesis is built. In order to explain processes of economic
divergence or convergence, political variables are crucial. Emphasizing institutions as
“historical choices”, Hall and Soskice (2001) pointed to persistent “Varieties of Capitalism” – 
liberal market economies on the one hand, coordinated market economies on the other hand. 
5 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/GDP_per_capita,_consumption_per_capita_and_
price_level_indices
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The latter, however, in recent years have implemented more extensive deregulation than the
former (Pierre 2015), possibly suggesting a convergence of the coordinated approach to the
liberal one. Nevertheless, the institutional perspective reminds us that similarity of economic
context (globalization and the resulting competitive pressure on national economies) not
inevitably translates into a convergence of policies. 
3.2. Policy convergence: the role of political processes
Theories of economic convergence are apolitical in the sense that they build on economic
variables (e.g., technological progress, capital accumulation) that may explain demand for
specific polices; yet they are silent on the workings of the “political market” where policy
supply needs to meet this demand (cf. Keohane et al. 1998). Policy convergence implies that 
demand is met in similar ways. In other words, problem convergence is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for policy convergence: in principle, states might find rather different
solutions to essentially identical problems. Thus, a comprehensive framework of convergence
needs to identify the specific mechanisms that lead states to adopt similar policy solutions.
As Figure 2 demonstrates, the literature on policy convergence mostly highlights different
forms of interdependence between states, possibly combined with elements of top-down
steering. Bennet (1991) proposed four different drivers of convergence: emulation, elite
networking, penetration by external actors and harmonization. Subsequently, the literature
focused on specific variations of Bennet’s first two mechanisms under the label “policy
diffusion” (Bush and Jörgens 2005, Tews 2005). In particular, the non-hierarchical character
of diffusion has been emphasized: “Diffusion is the spreading of innovations due to
communication instead of hierarchy or collective decision making within international 
institutions,” (Tews 2005: 65). Thus, diffusion is to be differentiated from coercive imposition 
and harmonization as other possible mechanisms that may establish homogeneous policies.
Diffusion proceeds horizontally rather than vertically and is “driven by information flows”
(Busch and Jörgens 2005: 865) within processes of emulation and learning. Coming back to 
Figure 2, policy diffusion marks the result of interdependent problem-solving: neither are
policies implemented due to pressure from above, nor are they conceived by solitary policy­
makers. Empirically, diffusion has been identified as a crucial driver of economic policy
reform in general (Pitlik 2007) and, more particularly, the spread of RES policies: “The
16
 
 
   
 
    
   
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
    
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
   
  
    
 
   
  
  
  
  
                                                          
    
international spread of feed-in tariffs6 and quotas was driven neither by mechanisms of
harmonization nor imposition. Rather, the analysis […] points to an important role of
diffusion mechanisms during the instruments’ spread” (Busch and Jörgens 2005: 876).  
The bottom-up drivers of policy convergence were further investigated by Holzinger and
Knill (2005), and Holzinger et al. (2008b) who focus on three bottom-up mechanisms of
convergence – transnational communication, regulatory competition and independent
problem-solving. Jacobs (2012) builds on this framework to evaluate convergence of RES
policies in Spain, France and Germany. First, transnational communication contributed to 
RES policy convergence between these EU Member States; in particular, it was “decisive for
the spread of certain feed-in tariff design options” (Jacobs 2012: 134). Second, regulatory
competition arises from Member States’ objective to stay competitive in terms of attracting
investment. Note that the idea of regulatory competition also aligns very well with the
“laboratory federalism” argument from the theory of fiscal federalism (Oates 1972, 1999).
While one of the main results of Holzinger et al.’s (2008a) empirical analysis is that
regulatory competition has only negligible explanatory power for environmental policy
convergence in the EU, Jacobs finds at least some evidence for convergence of photovoltaic
feed-in tariffs due to competition between EU Member States. Third, common problem
solving pressure may lead states to independently adapt very similar solutions: For instance,
rapidly cumulating remunerations for photovoltaic installations were a problem both in 
Germany and Spain during the late 2000s. As a solution, “flexible tariff degression was
developed independently in Germany and Spain” (Jacobs 2012: 227). 
Of course, the conceptualization of Figure 2 is rather abstract and coarse in that processes are
split into bottom-up or top down, as well as interdependent or independent. In reality
convergence processes may result from a combination of these ingredients. In particular, the
EU’s multi-level system with its complex architecture of partly differentiated, partly
overlapping and often contested allocation of responsibilities allows for hybrid processes.
From a formal perspective, decisions may be taken voluntary, yet at the same time they may
respond to pressures arising from EU-guidelines and intergovernmental discussions. The
example of RES targets and RES instruments perfectly illustrates these linkages. The RES
targets for 2020 were allocated via collective decision-making – from the EU Member States’
point of view, RES targets, therefore, frame national decisions on RES instruments. When 
6 Feed-in tariffs remunerate RES-producers with a certain amount for each kWh of electricity.
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designing specific policy instruments, Member States may cooperate, compete, communicate,
emulate one another or combine all of these activities.
Against this background, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), whereby the EU
Commission influences national policies by agenda setting and framing inter-Member State
discussions (cf. Ania and Wagener 2014, Borrás and Jacobsson 2004, Kerber and Eckardt
2007), represents one potentially important driver of convergence. For instance, Germany
recently introduced a test phase for tender schemes to determine the feed-in tariffs for large
photovoltaic installations – and this development might be interpreted as a case of preemptive
compliance with the EU-Commission’s push towards this direction, as laid down in the state
aid guidelines (Tews 2015). 
Thus, while the literature discusses a range of mechanisms for convergence of policies, it puts
a strong emphasis on diffusion, that is, horizontal spill-over effects. In contrast, top-down
imposition of policies is commonly referred to as harmonization – to be differentiated from
the bottom-up processes of convergence. However, the notion of bottom-up convergence
should not lead us to neglect the role of supranational institutions, in particular the EU
Commission, in framing and steering policy evolution on the Member State level.  
In conclusion, theories of economic and political convergence processes complement each
other: studies of economic convergence are largely apolitical as they do not aim to explain
why states choose or should choose the same policies to solve a given problem. At the same
time, economic convergence may often represent a necessary condition for successful policy
convergence. 
4. Assessing the case for RES policy convergence in the EU
In the following, we take a closer look at the empirical evidence for RES policy convergence
in the EU. A comprehensive statistical analysis, estimating convergence of all relevant
objects, merits a separate paper, whereas we here primarily aim at conceptual consolidation. 
For this reason we provide a succinct overview of the available descriptive evidence on the
development and the status quo of RES targets, instruments and shares. 
At the level of policy targets, the EU climate and energy package, set up in 2007/08, for the
first time required national governments to devise “National Renewable Energy Action Plans”
and specified binding RES targets for 2020 on Member State level. However, a standard of
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comparison for assessing convergence of targets is lacking because the updated 2030
framework, adopted in 2014, refrains from binding national targets.7 Instead, it only indicates
an EU-level RES target. One could, therefore, hypothesize that the 2030 framework will
prospectively decelerate convergence of RES shares (or even induce divergence) since
Member States cannot be hold accountable for failing their targets any more. As for the past
development, given the slow and clustered process of economic convergence and the binding
2020 package, it might be reasonable to expect some evidence of conditional convergence
with respect to the level of RES support instruments and RES shares. 
The early history of RES support instruments, from 1970 to 2000, is summarized by Knill et 
al. (2008: 115ff.) as the “emergence of two dominant approaches”, first “subsidies or tax 
reductions” and second “legal obligations for energy users to purchase a certain amount of
renewable energy”. Yet, in hindsight, the latter cannot be reasonably called a dominant
approach. Although quota schemes, that is, tradable permits obtained from fulfilling one’s
obligation to purchase a certain amount of RES, have been a long-time favorite of the EU
Commission, there is no long-term trend towards a widespread implementation of such
schemes. In fact, in 2000, out of the 9 RES-obligation schemes cited by Knill et al. (2008:
118), only one involved tradable certificates; and while the number rose to 6 in 2005, it has
been stagnating or even declining since then (cf. Table 2).  
Overall, there is some tendency towards convergence in that major support instruments for 
RES are available in all EU Member States since 2007. In particular, feed-in tariffs have
emerged as a popular support instrument, partly complemented by additional instruments
(Table 2, see Kitzing et al. 2012 for more details on the period 2000-2010). However, RES
support is continuously evolving: it would be a gross mistake to consider feed-in tariffs as the
“final state” of RES support where Member States converge first towards the instrument and 
then towards aligning specific regulatory details (e.g., Kitzing et al. 2012 differentiate 5 sub­
categories of feed-in tariffs). For instance, Jacobs (2012) analyses how the feed-in tariffs of 
France, Germany and Spain became increasingly similar over the years. But then the
economic crisis squeezed federal budgets in Spain, resulting in a drastic dismantling of the
RES support scheme in 2013.  
7 What is more, the 2020 targets refer to overall energy consumption. A previous directive (2001/77/EC) had set
(non-binding) targets for the RES share in gross electricity consumption in 2010, so the targets for 2010 and 
2020 are not comparable either.
19
 
 
     
     
 
 
    
     
     
  
  
 
 
 
   
    
   
 
 
   
   
  
    
 
     
   
    
                                                          
   
 
    
  
    
     
             
      
       
2000 2005 2010 2015
Feed-in tariff 7 16 23 19
Feed-in
premium
- 4 7 8
Tender 2 2 6 8
Quota scheme 1 6 6 5
Table 2: Number of EU Member States that have implemented

major RES support instruments, 2000-2015 

Source: Kitzing et al. 2012 for years 2000-2010, database www.RES-legal.eu for
 
20158
 
Furthermore, EU energy policy puts partly explicit, partly implicit pressure on Member States
to move away from feed-in tariffs. The Commission’s argument here reads (see Section 2.3): 
once common rules for the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity are
implemented all over the EU, substantial cross-border interactions will be prevalent, rendering 
country-specific support schemes incompatible. In order to minimize market distortions and 
inefficiencies, country-specific RES support should oblige RES producers to directly sell
electricity in the market, promoting the overall market-integration of RES and increasing 
cross-border electricity trading. Recent developments indicate that the Commission
successfully frames national discussions on RES policies along these lines (cf. Tews 2015).
Feed-in tariffs are increasingly complemented or replaced by feed-in premiums/tenders and
might have passed a peak around 2010 (see Table 2).  
In addition, and somewhat paradoxically, the very reason the EU Commission pushes for
premiums and tenders (leaving politico-economic motivations aside), the market integration 
of RES, also raises doubts as to whether any RES instrument will serve as a convergence line.
In short, no one knows what the best way to integrate RES into energy markets looks like. It
remains fundamentally unclear what the final state of RES support in a world with very high 
8 From 2005 on, the number of support schemes exceeds the number of EU Member States because many of the
latter are combining elements of different support schemes. Hence, one could conclude that a “meta-trend”
consists in increasing complexity of individual support schemes. This trend also implies ambiguity in counting:
to see this, consider the number of tenders for 2015. We arrive at 8 Member States that employ tenders but
considerably lower counts might be equally justified. One crucial question is whether to include schemes, which
use auctions within more complex mechanisms (such as Denmark of the Netherlands) or whether to focus on
tenders as main instrument. As more and more countries are experimenting with tenders, and as the
Commission’s guidelines intend to foster this development, we maintain a rather inclusive perspective – for
instance, we also include Germany’s current test-run for PV tenders into the count.
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RES shares might be (e.g., Kopp et al 2012): no more support at all? Alternatively, will
“energy-only” markets transform to remunerate production capacities, so that RES support is
fused with technology-neutral capacity payments? Eventually, different forms of market
integration might be observed.
At the level of RES shares, some empirical evidence for conditional convergence exists, 
while absolute convergence is not to be expected any time soon. Figure 3a suggests that
heterogeneity in natural conditions rather than economic heterogeneity accounts for most of
the observed differences in RES shares (in 2013). Consider Austria and Sweden, which
exhibit the highest shares of RES in gross electricity consumption: both rely heavily on
hydropower – traditionally so, rather than triggered by recent and current RES deployment
policies. By comparison, the Netherlands, with an even slightly higher level of GDP per
capita, only covers a fraction of its electricity consumption with RES.
However, as Figure 3b shows, the growth rates of RES shares in gross electricity consumption
are generally significantly higher for the Member States with low initial levels than for the
ones with high initial levels (a very similar pattern emerges in the case of RES shares at 
overall energy consumption, including heat and transport). This empirical result seems to
support the catching-up hypothesis. Moreover, the Member States’ catching-up in terms of
RES appears congruent to their economic catching-up (see Section 3.1): both catching-up
processes however occur slowly and have reduced but not yet eliminated substantial
differences between Member States. In other words, both processes display conditional
convergence. As laid out above, economic theory could explain this congruency via a causal
relation from economic growth over changes in peoples’ preferences towards more
environmental friendly electricity provision.   
The gist of the preceding discussion: national circumstances may be so diverse that even if all
Member States pursue similar paths towards RES-based energy systems and even if there is
broader economic convergence, this may not bring about absolute convergence of RES shares
and RES policies. At the same time, the case for conditional convergence seems rather strong.
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Figure 3a: Shares of Electricity Generated from RES in Gross Electricity Consumption
for EU-27 Member States in 2013
Figure 3b: Shares of Electricity Generated from RES in Gross Electricity Consumption

(EU-27, excluding Cyprus) over the Time Period 2004-2013:

Annual Average Growth Rates versus the Initial Level in 2004
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5. Conclusion
The main conceptual contribution of this paper consists in demonstrating the complementarity
of economic and political convergence theories. A comprehensive explanation of successful
policy convergence needs to account for both economic and political processes. Economic
convergence explains similarity of problems, but not similarity of policy solutions. 
Converging policies, in turn, do not solve the same problems if there is no economic
convergence. Certainly, a common institutional framework such as the EU may, to some
extent, also create similarity of problems: the EU climate and energy target architecture 
requires Member States’ governments to draw up national strategies and action plans for
increasing the share of RES, whether they perceive sustainable energy provision a goal
worthwhile pursuing or not. Conceptually, differences in economic performance can then be
framed as conditional convergence. But the European struggles to prevent the monetary union
from disintegrating in the first half of the 2010s demonstrate that policy convergence without
economic convergence might backfire.
Having applied a structured concept of convergence to the case of RES support policies in the
EU, two interesting points stand out. First, normative views on RES support translate into
specific conceptual decisions: for instance, a perspective that emphasizes the economic 
benefits from transnational support will focus on convergence of instruments – in fact, with
the explicit objective of generating diverging outcomes (i.e., RES shares) so as to optimize
allocation of production capacities following heterogeneous RES potential. In contrast, a
perspective that centers on distributional aspects will rather focus on converging RES targets
and RES shares, possibly conditional on Member States’ economic performance. Second, the
empirical development of RES policies indicates, again, the importance of economic
indicators as explanatory variables: although support schemes already seemed to converge
towards feed-in-tariffs at the end of the 2000s, the financial crisis, leading to glaring holes in 
Member States’ budgets, lowered priority of secure RES support on the overall policy
agendas – the extreme case being Spain, which completely suspended its support scheme as a
result. As of now (autumn 2015), cost-effectiveness of RES support seems to be the most
prominent objective of policy reform, possibly indicating a shift from feed-in-tariffs towards
tender schemes, in line with the Commission’s state aid guidelines. However, the
heterogeneity of Member States in terms of both RES potential and preferences for
sustainable energy provision may imply that, after all, there will not be only one but several
final states: for example, we might see several subsets of Member States with similar policies
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transforming their energy systems at similar speed, corresponding to their respective
economic performance (cf. Ćetković and Buzogány 2015). In consequence, RES policies
would converge towards different final states, unless economic convergence is achieved. 
Acknowledging the economic conditions of policy convergence may help to further close the
gap between theoretical and empirical literature on convergence (cf. Plümper and Schneider
2009). It also alerts us to the possibility of unpleasant surprises if economic fundamentals are
ignored. Jonung and Drea (2010) make early critics of the EU monetary union look like fools,
but they have not had the last laugh. In the context of RES, the consequences might be less
dramatic but still surprising: from Jacobs’s (2012) diligent analysis of convergence processes
in Germany, France and Spain one might get the impression that full alignment of feed-in
tariffs is imminent. Yet, just three years later, the future of feed-in tariffs seems far from
certain.
Since this paper’s main objective concerned conceptual clarification, the empirical analysis
has provided only a quick glance on the factual development of RES policies in the EU. More
detailed statistical analyses will be required to attain an in-depth understanding of the
empirical processes.
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